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ABSTRACT: The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence has focused on evaluating sets of consistent proposi-
tions. In this paper we draw attention to the largely neglected question of whether such measures concur with 
intuitions on test cases with inconsistent propositions and whether they satisfy general adequacy constraints on 
coherence and inconsistency. While it turns out that, for the vast majority of proposals in their original shape, 
this question must be answered in the negative, we show that it is possible to adapt many of them in order to 
improve their performance. 
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RESUMEN: El debate sobre las medidas probabilísticas de coherencia se ha centrado en evaluar conjuntos de proposicio-
nes consistentes. En este artículo llamamos la atención sobre una cuestión largamente postergada, a saber, si ta-
les medidas coinciden con las intuiciones sobre los ejemplos de prueba relativos a proposiciones inconsistentes, 
y si satisfacen condiciones generales de adecuación para la coherencia y la inconsistencia. Aunque esta cuestión 
se responde negativamente para la mayoría de propuestas, mostramos cómo es posible adaptar muchas de ellas 
para mejorar su rendimiento en este sentido.  
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1. Introduction
Looking at the flourishing history of formal explications of coherence, we see a pattern of 
growing complexity. The most prominent strand ranges from Ewing’s (1934) early char-
acterisation of coherence in terms of consistency and mutual derivability, over Lewis’ 
(1946) qualitative explication of coherent propositions as “being so related that the an-
tecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can 
be assumed as given premises” (1946, 338), to Douven and Meijs’ (2007) sophisticated 
recipe for probabilistic measures of coherence in the sense of mutual confirmation.1 Glass 
(2002) and Olsson (2002), on the other hand, have proposed a measure of coherence in 
the sense of relative set-theoretic overlap. Since this measure turned out to be too coarse-
grained, Meijs (2006) put forward a refined version that is sensitive to subsets of the ini-
tial set whose coherence is to be assessed. 
The latest contribution to this pattern is Schupbach’s (2011) insightful paper on an 
alternative generalisation of Shogenji’s (1999) measure of coherence in the sense of devia-
tion from probabilistic independence. Surmising that “the problem with Shogenji’s meas-
1 For a recent survey of Bayesian confirmation theory see Crupi 2014.
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ure has more to do with his means of generalising the measure than with the measure itself” 
(2011, 125), Schupbach shows that a more elaborate generalisation allows the measure to 
handle two troubling counterexamples. One of them, which is part of the so-called Depth 
Problem, will be the starting point of our current investigation. We will show that, while 
most coherence measures are able to cope with this problem as it stands, slightly modifying 
Schupbach’s test case has a devastating consequence. 
In more general terms, we will rivet on the hitherto largely neglected question of 
whether probabilistic measures of coherence adequately handle inconsistent sets of testi-
monies. To do so, we focus on two sets of inconsistent testimonies exhibiting different de-
grees of coherence (or incoherence, if you will). It will turn out that virtually no coherence 
measure adequately captures our intuition on this test case. Since in many cases the reason 
is that the given measures are not defined for sets of pairwise inconsistent propositions, we 
propose four ways of adapting them. For all but one measure our results are robust in the 
sense that all four adaption strategies provide adequate results. In the second last section, 
two further intuitions on our test case and two general adequacy constraints on coherence 
and inconsistency are taken into account. It will be shown how the measures fare with the 
additional intuitions and adequacy constraints under the four different adaption strategies; 
and it will be pointed out that one of these strategies does not go well with the idea that co-
herence is mutual confirmation. In the last section, a brief summary and an outlook on fur-
ther questions concerning coherence and consistency is given. 
2. Probabilistic measures of coherence 
A measure of coherence is a (partial) function assigning sets of propositions real numbers 
representing the sets’ degrees of coherence. When a coherence measure takes into account 
solely probabilistic information relating to the propositions in question, it is called a proba-
bilistic measure of coherence. Without providing a motivation for the proposed functions, 
this section briefly lists some of them. Let S = {A1, ... , An} be a set of propositions.2
The naïve deviation measure3
D S( )= P A1&…& An( )P A1( )⋅…⋅P An( )
The naïve overlap measure4
O S( )= P A1&…& An( )P A1( )∨…∨P An( )
2 Here and in what follows we assume that P is a regular probability measure so that all and only contra-
dictions are assigned a minimum probability of 0. Accordingly, only tautologies have a probability of 1. 
3 This measure has been proposed by Shogenji (1999). 
4 This measure has been put forward independently by Glass (2002) and Olsson (2002).
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Both the naïve deviation and the naïve overlap measure are based on a straightforward gen-
eralisation from the case of two to the case of n propositions: simply take the conjunction 
of all propositions in the set and divide it by the product of the marginal probabilities 
or the probability of the disjunction of all propositions, respectively. However, for both 
measures, more sophisticated generalisations have been proposed. The common idea be-
hind these refinements is to take into account the coherence values of subsets of S and 
to consider the weighted average of all coherence values for all subsets with at least two 
propositions. To have a unified framework, let [S]k denote the set of all subsets of S with 
cardinality k. Then the cardinality of [S]k is mk = (nk) = n!/k! (n – k)!. Furthermore, let m = ∑2 ≤ k ≤ n mk.
The refined deviation measure5
D *(S)= 1
m
log10D(Si )
Si∈[S ]k
∑
k=2
n
∑
The refined overlap measure6
O *(S)= 1
m
O(Si )
Si∈[S ]k
∑
k=2
n
∑
Obviously, both refined ways of generalising the given measures are subset-sensitive in the 
sense that sets being assigned the same initial coherence values on D or O might differ re-
garding D* or O*. 
The mutual support account7
The family of approaches to coherence as mutual support is based on the following simple 
and appealing idea: a set’s degree of coherence depends on the degree of confirmation (aka 
support) its elements provide for each other. To implement this idea, choose a probabilis-
tic measure of support s and calculate the extent to which each proposition and conjunc-
tion of propositions is supported by each remaining proposition and conjunction of them. 
Finally, the straight average of all results represents the set’s degree of coherence. More for-
mally, mutual support measures consider the degree of support between all pairs (S', S"), 
where S' and S"  are non-empty, disjoint subsets of S. For each set S = {A1, ... , An}, let [S] de-
5 Cf. Schupbach 2011. Note that Schupbach considers alternative weighting systems. To simplify com-
parison with the other approaches, we focus on the straight average. 
6 This measure is due to Meijs (2006).
7 The first probabilistic measure based on the idea of coherence as mutual support is Fitelson’s (2003, 
2004). Later, Douven and Meijs (2007) systematically developed and generalised his account. For a re-
cent constraint-based evaluation see Schippers 2014b. 
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note the set of all such pairs; then the cardinality l of [S] is given by l = ∑i n = – 1 1 (ni )(2n–1 – 1). Accordingly, for each support measure s, the corresponding coherence measure Cs is de-
fined as follows:
Cs(S)=
s(∧ ′S ,∧ ′′S )
l( ′S , ′′S )∈[S ]
∑
Obviously, the calculated degree of coherence crucially depends on the chosen meas-
ure s. The following list assembles prominent measures of the support A provides for B 
from the literature on Bayesian confirmation theory.8
Prior-posterior difference
d (B, A) = P (B | A) – P (B)
Prior-posterior ratio
r (B, A) = P (B | A) / P (B)
Counterfactual difference
s (B, A) = P (B | A) – P (B | ¬A)
Counterfactual ratio
j(B,A)= P(B |A)
P(B |¬A)
8 Note that this list does not exhaust all confirmation measures. Instead, we focus on what seem to be 
the most prominent ones. Since support-based coherence measures take into account mutual support, 
it is often the case that different confirmation measures yield the same coherence measure. This is due 
to the fact that some confirmation measures are so related that one can be generated from the other 
by systematically switching the argument positions. Hence, the above measures represent a wide range 
of confirmation-based coherence measures. Among the advocates of d are Gillies (1986) and Jeffrey 
(1992). Proponents of s include Christensen (1999) and Joyce (1999). Measure j is ordinally equivalent 
to Joyce’s (2008) odds-ratio measure. The measure z has independently been proposed by Crupi et al. 
(2007) and Siebel (2006). Measures ordinally equivalent to r have been proposed by Horwich (1982), 
Keynes (1921), Kuipers (2000) and Milne (1996). Measure k or ordinally equivalent measures have 
been proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952), Good (1984) and Heckerman (1988). Measures 
similar to f are to be found in Schippers and Siebel (2012) and Roche (2013).
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Relative distance 
z(B,A)=
P(B |A)−P(B)
1−P(B) if  P(B |A)≥ P(B)
P(B |A)−P(B)
P(B)
otherwise.







Factual support
k(B,A)= P(A |B)−P(A |¬B)
P(A |B)+P(A |¬B)
The previous measures calculate the degree of incremental support, where a proposi-
tion A incrementally supports a proposition B iff P (B | A) > P (B). In contrast, the follow-
ing measure quantifies a separate kind of confirmation, sometimes called absolute confirma-
tion (or firmness). According to this notion, a proposition A confirms a proposition B iff 
P (B | A) > r for some threshold r ≥ 0.5 (cf. Carnap 1962). To get a measure with the range 
[–1, +1] and 0 as the neutral value for P (B | A) = 0.5, we propose to measure firmness not 
simply by the posterior but by the following function.
Firmness
f (B, A) = 2 ∙ P (B | A) – 1
Since this function is equivalent to P (B | A) – P (¬B | A), our firmness measure can also be 
seen as an analogue to the counterfactual difference measure of incremental support. Any-
way, inserting one of the seven support measures into the above recipe yields a probabilistic 
measure of coherence. Thus, together with the first two measures and their refinements, we 
will consider eleven coherence measures.   
Bovens and Hartmann’s quasi-ordering
Although the main topic of this paper is probabilistic measures of coherence, we wish to in-
clude the quasi-ordering proposed by Bovens and Hartmann (2003a; 2003b, ch. 1f.). They 
argue that the following function enables us to determine the relative coherence of two sets 
of propositions:
Fr (S)=
a0+an(1−r)n
ai (1−r)i
i=0
n
∑
,
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where ai is the probability that i of the n propositions in set S are false, and r is the reliabil-
ity of the propositions’ sources. (The sources are supposed to be independent in a specific 
way; and they are partially reliable such that, on the definition of r, 0 < r < 1). To be sure, 
Fr does not represent the propositions’ degree of coherence because it is functionally de-
pendent on the credibility of their sources. Bovens and Hartmann’s claim is rather that 
supplementing this formula with a simple assumption makes it possible to compare systems 
of statements with respect to coherence:
S is at least as coherent as S' iff for all values of r, Fr(S) ≥ Fr(S').
Thus, if the Fr-values for S are, for all degrees of partial reliability, greater (smaller) than the 
corresponding values for S', then S is more (less) coherent than S'.
3. The Depth Problem redux
Schupbach’s Depth Problem is based on an objection raised by Fitelson (2003, 196f.) 
against the naïve deviation measure. Remember that this measure calculates the de-
gree of a set’s coherence in terms of the deviation from probabilistic independence. 
Fitelson points to the fact that there are sets of propositions being n-wise independent
(i.e. P(A1 ∧ ... ∧ An) = P(A1) ∙ ... ∙ P(An)) but k-wise dependent for k < n (so that 
P(Ai1 ∧ ... ∧ Aik) ≠ P(Ai1) ∙ ... ∙ P(Aik) for a subset {i1, ... , ik} ⊊ {1, ... , n}). Intuitively, these
dependencies should also been taken into account when calculating a set’s degree of coher-
ence. Hence, “Shogenji’s measure does not dig deeply enough into the probabilistic infor-
mation of the scenario” (Schupbach 2011, 129). The following example stems from Schup-
bach (2011).
Imagine a court case in which three independent and equally reliable witnesses testify 
on the culprit of a robbery. All that is known for sure is that the culprit is one out of eight 
suspects who have been collected by the police and that each of the suspects is equally 
likely to have committed the robbery. In scenario 1, witness i provides the following infor-
mation Wi:
W1: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
W2: The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 4.
W3: The criminal was either suspect 1, 3 or 4.  
In scenario 2, witness i gives the information Wi' :
W1' : The criminal was either suspect 1, 2 or 3.
W2' : The criminal was either suspect 1, 4 or 5.
W3' : The criminal was either suspect 1, 6 or 7.
Let E = {W1, W2, W3} and E' = {W1', W2', W3' }. Then, “intuitively, the testimonies of 
the witnesses in the first scenario ‘hang together’ much more so than the testimonies of 
the witnesses in the second scenario” (Schupbach 2011, 129), so that E is more coher-
ent than E'. However, according to Shogenji’s measure, both scenarios are on a par, i.e. 
CSh(E) = 64/27 = CSh(E'). This example constitutes one of the key motivations for Schup-
bach’s refined generalisation. 
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As we know from our overview of coherence measures, the majority of them are as fine-
grained as Schupbach’s measure. Hence, it comes as no surprise that most of them cope 
with Schupbach’s example. Table 1 summarises the measures’ performances (for a proof see 
appendix A). Hence, besides the naïve deviation measure D, only the ratio-based coherence 
measures Cr and Cj and Bovens and Hartmann’s quasi-ordering do not pass the test. The 
reason for the latter’s failure is not that it judges the testimonies in scenario 1 equally or less 
coherent than the testimonies in scenario 2, but that it abstains from judgement. As a first 
result, note that the given test case does not only promote Schupbach’s refined variant of 
the naïve deviation measure but also many further proposals.
Table 1: Performance of coherence measures in Schupbach’s robber case. A “+” 
indicates that the measure concurs with the intuition that the testimonies are more 
coherent in scenario 1, while “–” indicates that the measure violates this intuition.
Coherence measure D O D* O* Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf Fr
Schupbach’s robber case – + + + + – + – + + + –
4. A slight modification: inconsistent testimonies
The testimonies in Schupbach’s robber case are consistent because, in both scenarios, all 
of them were true if suspect 1 would have committed the crime. But consider a variant of 
Schupbach’s example. Assume there to be six suspects where each is equally likely to be the 
culprit. In scenario 1, witness i provides the following information Vi :
V1: The criminal was either suspect 1 or 2.
V2: The criminal was either suspect 2 or 3.
V3: The criminal was either suspect 1 or 3.  
In scenario 2, witness i testifies to Vi':
V1' : The criminal was either suspect 1 or 2.
V2' : The criminal was either suspect 3 or 4.
V3' : The criminal was either suspect 5 or 6.
The crucial difference between F = {V1, V2, V3} and F' = {V1', V2', V3'} on the one hand and 
E and E' from Schupbach’s example is that F and F' are both inconsistent sets. Nonethe-
less, it seems that the testimonies in the first scenario are still more coherent (or in other 
words, less incoherent) than the ones in the second scenario. This is due to the fact that, 
while in the second scenario the testimonies are also pairwise inconsistent, all pairs of tes-
timonies in the first scenario are consistent.9 Put another way, there is an overlap between 
 9  Similarly, the testimonies in the second scenario seem to exhibit a higher degree of inconsistency. The rela-
tionship between degrees of incoherence and degrees of inconsistency is investigated in Schippers 2014a. 
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the accused suspects for all pairs of testimonies in the first scenario, whereas in the second 
one pairwise overlap is empty. We thus conclude that F should be assigned a higher degree 
of coherence (or alternatively, a lower degree of incoherence) than F'. However, as table 2 
shows, this demand is violated by all measures except one (proof in appendix A). We thus 
have to realise that hardly any account handles inconsistent sets of testimonies in an ade-
quate way.10
Table 2: Performance of coherence measures in the modified robber case.
Coherence measure D O D* O* Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf Fr
Th e modifi ed robber case – – – + – – – – – – – –
5. Adapting the measures
The foregoing result looks quite devastating. Does it mean that O* is the only coherence 
measure worth further investigation? No, there is still hope – at least for Schupbach’s meas-
ure D* and the mutual support measures.
An analysis of the calculations shows that the first two measures fail our test because 
they are insensitive to pairwise agreement within inconsistent sets of propositions. More 
precisely, all inconsistent sets are assigned the minimal coherence value. These measures 
are thus ruled out because they are clearly not sophisticated enough (cf. Siebel 2005). 
Bovens and Hartmann’s quasi-ordering must also be dismissed because, as a matter of 
principle, it is not defined for inconsistent sets. In Bovens and Hartmann’s (2005, 368) 
own words, “our criterion is meant to impose a quasi-ordering on consistent information 
sets. Nostra culpa, we should have made this explicit”. This account is thus too limited 
from the start.
However, the situation is quite different for the remaining measures. For example, 
Schupbach’s refined version of Shogenji’s deviation measure fails because of the kind of 
normalisation built into it. D* is an average of logarithmised D-values. Since D is 0 for all 
sets of inconsistent testimonies, and since the logarithm for 0 is –∞, Schupbach’s meas-
ure states that both scenarios include maximally incoherent testimonies. One possibility to 
adapt this measure would be to dispense with the logarithm and simply average over the in-
itial D-values.11 However, while this can indeed be considered a solution to the test case at 
hand, it provokes a problem initially motivating Schupbach’s choice of the logarithm. Note 
that D ranges from 0 to infinity, where all values exceeding 1 indicate coherence. Hence, 
when we combine various degrees of coherence and incoherence for subsets of a given set 
of testimonies, it will happen that a high degree of coherence of one subset offsets a large 
10  Note that we are concerned with only two test cases in this paper. For an extensive analysis of a wide 
range of test cases see Koscholke (2014).
11  Shogenji (2005) anticipated the need to adapt his coherence measure for inconsistent sets of testimo-
nies. His proposal is based on the pair-wise coherence of the elements of a given set of testimonies.
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number of high degrees of incoherence of other subsets. Therefore, we propose the follow-
ing rescaled version D# of the naïve deviation measure: 
D# (A1, ... , An) = 1 – 2–D (A1, ... , An)
This measure’s range is [0,1) with 0.5 indicating neutrality. Accordingly, our preferred re-
finement of the naïve deviation measure reads as follows:
D#*(S)=
1
m
D#(Si )
Si∈[S ]k
∑
k=2
n
∑
This variant passes the test because it assigns a value between 0.5 and 0 to the first scenario 
and the minimum 0 to the scenario with inconsistent testimonies (see appendix A).
The mutual support measures fail for a similar reason. They remain silent on the 
scenario with pairwise inconsistent testimonies because the underlying confirmation 
measures do not cope with such inconsistencies. For example, d = (V1', V2' & V3' ) does 
not have a value because P(V2' & V3' ) is 0 and thus P(V1' | V2' & V3' ) not defined. Accord-
ingly, one could try to put forward adapted versions of the confirmation measures in 
order to expand their domain to inconsistent evidence. From the perspective of classi-
cal logic, it might be tempting to adjudicate the maximal degree of confirmation when 
the evidence is inconsistent because, classically, inconsistent propositions deductively 
entail anything. From the perspective of a coherentist, however, this is an unfortunate 
attempt because it means conceding a coherence-boosting role to inconsistent proposi-
tions. Since inconsistencies are usually taken to have a negative impact on coherence, it 
seems more adequate to assign minimal degrees of confirmation in the case of incon-
sistent evidence. 
However, this adaption does not solve the problem that some measures exhibit sin-
gularities for inconsistent hypotheses. Fortunately, there is a recipe accounting for both 
of these problems at once (cf. Fitelson 2004, Roche 2013). Note that, again classically, 
evidence A implies the negation of hypothesis B not only if A is inconsistent but also if 
B is inconsistent. This fact can be used for a case differentiation combining incon-
sistent evidence and inconsistent hypotheses. If A implies ¬B, we assign the greatest 
lower bound of the corresponding support measure, that is, –1 for d, s, z, k and f, and 0 
for r and j. In all other cases, we just take the value provided by the given measure in its 
original shape.12 
Table 3 summarises the performance of the adapted measures regarding our test 
case with inconsistent testimonies (proof in appendix A). Hence, the first adaption 
strategy, namely assigning minimal degrees of confirmation in the case of inconsistent 
evidence or hypotheses, leads to improved outcomes of all support-based coherence 
measures.
12  The resulting measure Ck is Fitelson’s (2003, 2004). Roche (2013) proposed a measure similar to the 
corresponding variant of Cf.
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Table 3: Performance of support-based coherence measures on the first adaption 
strategy.
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Th e modifi ed robber case + + + + + + +
However, since the first strategy might smack of adhocness, we consider three alternative 
proposals.13 The first two try to solve the problem from a confirmational standpoint. The 
issue then is how much inconsistent evidence confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis, and a 
natural answer is that it has no evidential impact at all. The same seems to hold for incon-
sistent hypotheses: whatever the evidence may be, it can neither support nor undermine 
such a hypothesis. Given these thoughts, we suggest to assign not the minimum but the 
neutral degree of confirmation once the evidence or the hypothesis is inconsistent, viz., 0 
for d, s, z, k and f, and 1 for r and j. If both evidence and hypothesis are consistent, then 
again the original measure’s value will be chosen. The results for this second proposal can 
be seen in table 4 (proof in appendix A). As this table indicates, the second adaptation 
strategy yields improved results for all coherence measures based on incremental support. 
However, this is not the case for the measure based on the absolute concept of confirma-
tion because here we get identical values for the scenarios.
Table 4: Performance of support-based coherence measures on the second adaption 
strategy. 
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Th e modifi ed robber case + + + + + + –
The third strategy is a mixture of the first and the second. One of the basic ideas here is that 
consistent evidence maximally disconfirms hypotheses whose negation follows from the evi-
dence. Since, classically at least, the negation of an inconsistency follows from any evidence, 
we should therefore, parallel to the first strategy, assign the lowest confirmation value if the 
hypothesis is inconsistent and the evidence consistent. In the case of inconsistent evidence, 
however, the second strategy comes into play insofar as such evidence is taken to have nei-
ther a positive nor a negative evidential impact. That is, in such a case the neutral degree of 
confirmation is assigned. The results for this mixed strategy are given in table 5. 
Table 5: Performance of support-based coherence measures on the third adaption 
strategy. 
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Th e modifi ed robber case + + + + + + +
13 We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting the last two strategies to us.
Theoria 30/1 (2015): 11-41
 Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures 21
There is yet a fourth possibility to improve the measures’ performance: simply neglect the 
troublesome elements entering the calculation of each measure’s average. That is, in order 
to determine the coherence of a set of propositions, we simply take the average of defined 
confirmation values. As is shown in table 6, this strategy yields the same positive results as 
the first and third one (proof in appendix A). 
Table 6: Performance of support-based coherence measures on the fourth adaption 
strategy. 
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Th e modifi ed robber case + + + + + + +
6. Including two further intuitions and two adequacy constraints
We have offered four proposals for adapting the measures of coherence built after Douven 
and Meijs’ recipe. For the vast majority of proposals, the results are robust insofar as they 
do not depend on the chosen modification: no matter which suggestion we adopt, all of the 
given measures let the pairwise consistent testimonies be more coherent than the pairwise 
inconsistent ones, the only exception being the firmness-based measure. So far, so good. 
But let us broaden the perspective now by including two further intuitions on our test case 
and by proceeding to general adequacy constraints on coherence and consistency.
Up to now, we were only concerned with one intuition:
(Int1) The testimonies in scenario 2 have a lower degree of coherence than the testi-
monies in scenario 1.
It seems that we can go beyond this comparative claim by adding a qualitative and a quan-
titative claim. First, even if the testimonies in scenario 1 are not pairwise inconsistent, they 
are still inconsistent as a whole. This could be seen as a reason for judging them incoherent: 
(Int2) The testimonies in scenario 1 are incoherent.
Second, since the testimonies in scenario 2 are pairwise inconsistent, they exhibit an ex-
tremely strong kind of inconsistency. It thus appears that they are not only incoherent but 
incoherent to a large extent:
(Int3) The testimonies in scenario 2 are highly incoherent.
Table 7 shows that, regardless of what type of adaption we choose, there are support-based 
measures not complying with both of these further intuitions (proof in appendix A). For 
example, Cj invariably delivers the neutral value for scenario 1 and is thus in conflict with 
the second intuition in any case. Even worse, when we adopt the second strategy by assign-
ing the neutral degree of confirmation in the case of inconsistent evidence or hypotheses, 
we are left with no measure confirming to intuition 3. Here the values of all measures are 
either in the middle or the upper half of their incoherence ranges. They thus judge the tes-
timonies in the second scenario not highly but only moderately incoherent.
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Table 7: Performance of support-based coherence measures as to the two further 
intuitions.
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Minimum value strategy, Int2 + + + – + + +
Minimum value strategy, Int3 + + + + + + +
Neutral value strategy, Int2 + + + – + + +
Neutral value strategy, Int3 – – – – – – –
Mixed value strategy, Int2 + + + – + + +
Mixed value strategy, Int3 + + + + + + +
Defi ned value strategy, Int2 + + + – + + +
Defi ned value strategy, Int3 – + – + + + +
The second intuition might be considered an instance of a general adequacy constraint 
to be found, among other things, in BonJour’s coherentist classic The Structure of Empirical 
Knowledge. “A system of beliefs is coherent”, we read there, “only if it is logically consistent” 
(BonJour 1985, 95; cf. Bartelborth 1999, 136). Strictly speaking, this formulation leaves 
open the possibility that inconsistent sets are neither coherent nor incoherent; but it is pre-
sumably meant to be understood in the slightly stronger sense that such sets are incoherent. 
Moreover, a set of propositions can be inconsistent because it contains an inconsistent prop-
osition, and it can be inconsistent because two or more of its elements entail an inconsist-
ency. We will focus on the former type so that our adequacy constraint reads as follows:
(AC1) Sets with an inconsistent proposition are incoherent.
Note, however, that this is not plain sailing. BonJour himself suggests in a footnote 
that a sufficient number of coherence-boosting relations between the propositions in ques-
tion could compensate for inconsistencies (cf. BonJour 1985, fn. 7, 240; Amaya 2007, 
441). The first adequacy constraint is thus debatable, and the same holds for the second 
intuition. Note furthermore, that a positive result for a particular measure regarding con-
straint AC1 does not mean that the measure also satisfies the general constraint that all in-
consistent sets are incoherent. On the other hand, a measure’s violation of AC1 entails that 
the measure also violates the general constraint. 
In contrast, the following adequacy constraint seems to be quite solid. Even if one al-
lows inconsistent sets to be coherent under certain conditions, one will proscribe rais-
ing the coherence of an otherwise consistent set by adding an inconsistent proposition 
(cf. Bartelborth 1996, 193). That much seems evident. For example, if the testimonies of 
witnesses cohere and a further witness appears on the scene stating something inconsist-
ent, then the resulting set of testimonies is less coherent than the original set. Likewise, 
adding an inconsistent testimony to an incoherent set brings about an even more inco-
herent set. There might be one case where the coherence does not go down: given that a 
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consistent set can be maximally incoherent any way, adding an inconsistent proposition 
cannot make such a set less coherent. However, in all other cases inconsistencies have a 
negative impact:
(AC2) Adding an inconsistent proposition to a consistent set lowers coherence (pro-
vided the set is not maximally incoherent).
As table 8 displays, the first adaption strategy is the only one leading to a general satisfaction 
of the second constraint. On the fourth strategy, this constraint is met only by the firmness-
based measure; and on the second and third strategy, it is met by no measure at all. As to the 
second proposal applied to measures Cr and Cj, if the consistent set is incoherent, the set 
with the inconsistency is less incoherent. And Cd, Cs, Cz, Ck and Cf  let the set with the in-
consistency be just as coherent as the original set when the latter is neither coherent nor in-
coherent. The third account leads to results being a little weaker but nevertheless in conflict 
with the second constraint. Moreover, on the second, third and fourth strategy, all or almost 
all measures come into conflict with the first adequacy constraint because they rule that the 
set with the inconsistency is coherent if the original set is coherent (proof in appendix B).
Table 8: Performance of support-based coherence measures as to the two adequacy 
constraints. 
Coherence measure Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Minimum value strategy, AC1 + – + – + + +
Minimum value strategy, AC2 + + + + + + +
Neutral value strategy, AC1 – – – – – – –
Neutral value strategy, AC2 – – – – – – –
Mixed value strategy, AC1 – – – – – – –
Mixed value strategy, AC2 – – – – – – –
Defi ned value strategy, AC1 – – – – – – +
Defi ned value strategy, AC2 – – – – – – +
But which kind of adaption is the means of choice all things considered? If we take into ac-
count all intuitions and adequacy constraints and just count for every strategy how many 
measures satisfy these intuitions and constraints, the winner is clearly strategy one. It is the 
only strategy on which all but one measure satisfy the three normative intuitions; and there 
is no other strategy allowing more measures to satisfy both adequacy constraints. Hence, 
the first proposal, where inconsistent evidence and inconsistent hypotheses lead to the 
smallest possible confirmation value, seems to be the best option for adapting coherence 
measures in the light of inconsistent testimonies. What is more, this strategy was already es-
tablished by scholars like Fitelson (2004) and Roche (2013) and thus owes some additional 
merits. 
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However, from a confirmational point of view this strategy is highly problematic. Re-
member that the measures in question are meant to quantify coherence in terms of mutual 
support. If we take that seriously, the underlying measures d, r, s, j, z, k and f must be fine-
tuned in line with the principles regulating support. But then adopting the first strategy 
means burdening oneself with the claims that (1) inconsistent evidence maximally discon-
firms any hypothesis and (2) an inconsistent hypothesis is maximally disconfirmed by any 
evidence. Since these presuppositions are questionable at least, it is far from clear that the 
coherence measures resulting from the first proposal can be considered measures of mutual 
support.
First of all, it seems to make much more sense to say that inconsistent evidence has no 
evidential impact on any hypothesis whatsoever. This intuition is the common core of strat-
egies two and three. The second strategy assumes furthermore that an inconsistent hypoth-
esis can neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed by any evidence. Given that this strategy 
produces devastating results as to intuition 3 and both adequacy constraints, however, opt-
ing for it seems to be a non-starter when it comes to  the coherence of inconsistent testimo-
nies. The mixed account three assesses inconsistent hypotheses in line with the first one, but 
inconsistent evidence in line with the second one. As to intuition 3, it improves on the sec-
ond account, but it is equally bad regarding both adequacy constraints. Having to choose be-
tween these strategies, we appear to be on the horns of a dilemma. Either we stick to meas-
uring coherence as mutual support and thus adopt the second or third strategy; but then we 
do not come to grips with inconsistencies because, among other things, we cannot satisfy the 
adequacy constraints. Or we choose the first strategy and thus come to grips with inconsist-
encies; but then we do not measure coherence in the sense of mutual support anymore.14
Does the fourth proposal provide a loophole? This proposal consists in remaining 
with the original support measures while neglecting the undefined cases when it comes 
to coherence. To accept this proposal means to take no stance on the degree of confir-
mation in the case of inconsistent evidence or hypotheses. Hence, it is attractive for peo-
ple who want to adhere to the conception of coherence as mutual support but think that 
there is no true approach to inconsistent evidence or hypotheses. However, such peo-
ple should drop all of the given measures except the firmness variant because the latter is 
then the only measure satisfying the adequacy constraints.
Remember that there are two further measures conforming to the thought that the 
pairwise inconsistent testimonies in scenario 2 are more incoherent, namely, Meijs’ vari-
ant O* of the naïve overlap measure and our Schupbach-like variant D*# of the naïve devia-
tion measure. How do they fare with the additional intuitions and adequacy constraints? O* 
and D*# fare well with both of these intuitions (proof in appendix A), and O* also satisfies 
both constraints (proof in appendix B). But D*# needs the same type of helping hand as the 
support-based measures because the underlying Shogenji measure D is not defined when 
one of the propositions is inconsistent. Unlike the support-based measures, D*# is not an 
average of confirmation-values but of the coherence-values given by our rescaled version D# 
of the Shogenji measure D. Thus, to adopt the first strategy means here to let D# assign 
minimum coherence to all sets containing an inconsistent proposition. The second strat-
egy would be to let D# assign the neutral coherence value in these cases. The third strategy, 
14 However, see the remarks on pairs of inconsistent propositions in the conclusion.
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where we distinguish between inconsistent evidence and inconsistent hypotheses, does 
not seem to make sense for deviation-based measures and will thus not be taken into ac-
count. The fourth strategy simply is to exclude these undefined cases from the calculation 
of the average. It can then be shown that the first strategy is the only one where D*# satisfies 
both constraints (proof in appendix B). 
Table 9 brings together all results. What is the meaning of it? First, if you want all in-
tuitions and adequacy constraints to be met, Cr and Cj are ruled out. For both satisfy (AC1) 
under no strategy, and Cj also violates intuition 2 under all strategies. The measures remain-
Table 9: Performance of all coherence measures as to all intuitions and adequacy 
constraints. 
Coherence measure O* D*# Cd Cr CS Cj Cz Ck Cf
Intuition 1 + +
Strategy 1 + + + + + + +
Strategy 2 + + + + + + –
Strategy 3 + + + + + + +
Strategy 4 + + + + + + +
Intuition 2 + +
Strategy 1 + + + – + + +
Strategy 2 + + + – + + +
Strategy 3 + + + – + + +
Strategy 4 + + + – + + +
Intuition 3 + +
Strategy 1 + + + + + + +
Strategy 2 – – – – – – –
Strategy 3 + + + + + + +
Strategy 4 – + – + + + +
Constraint 1 +
+ Strategy 1 + – + – + + +
– Strategy 2 – – – – – – –
Strategy 3 – – – – – – –
– Strategy 4 – – – – – – +
Constraint 2 +
+ Strategy 1 + + + + + + +
– Strategy 2 – – – – – – –
Strategy 3 – – – – – – –
– Strategy 4 – – – – – – +
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ing are the refined overlap measure O*; the refined deviation measure D*#; Cd, Cs, Cz and 
Ck under strategy one, and Cf under strategy one and three. However, since strategy one 
does not go well with the notion that coherence is mutual support, advocates of this no-
tion seem to be left with no other option than the mutual firmness variant Cf under strat-
egy three.
Second, if you think that intuition 2 and constraint 1 are shaky because sets containing 
just one inconsistency can be coherent, then Cr and Cj remain in the running for the mo-
ment. Furthermore, like Cf , they allow for intuition 3 not only under strategy one but also un-
der strategy three and four. However, since they conform to constraint 2 only under strat-
egy one, which is in conflict with the notion that coherence is mutual support, again, they 
seem to provide no option for someone who wants to quantify this notion.
More generally, there are two stances one could take up vis-à-vis the results in table 9. 
On the one hand, one could try to devise arguments for the superiority of a particular adap-
tion account and then dismiss measures violating certain intuitions or constraints on this 
account. On the other hand, one could argue for the superiority of a particular coherence 
measure and dismiss those adaption strategies giving rise to negative results for this very 
measure. For example, if one adheres to the firmness-based coherence measure Cf  (like Ro-
che 2013 seems to do), then the only possible kinds of adaption are the maximum discon-
firmation strategy and the strategy based on defined values (where the former was indeed 
proposed in Roche 2013). It thus seems that our results should in general be considered a 
toolbox for coherentists who can draw on our work when arguing either for the superiority 
of an adaption strategy or the superiority of a coherence measure.  
7. Conclusion and outlook
In their original shape, the vast majority of probabilistic measures did not properly quan-
tify the degree of coherence of the inconsistent testimonies in our test case. The naïve devi-
ation measure and the naïve overlap measure delivered the untoward judgement that both 
scenarios are equally incoherent. The measures of mutual support in line with Douven and 
Meijs’ recipe, as well as the refined deviation measure and Bovens and Hartmann’s quasi-
ordering, were not even able to tackle the test case because they remain silent on pairwise 
inconsistent sets in general. The only measure coping with our example was Meijs’ refined 
variant of the naïve overlap measure. 
In the next step, we adapted the refined deviation measure by rescaling it, and we put 
forward four different proposals for extending the scope of the mutual support measures 
to pairwise inconsistent propositions. Although all but one of the measures provided the 
desired judgement on our test case under each proposal, they encountered serious difficul-
ties when we included two further intuitions and two general adequacy constraints. For the 
first three adaption strategies ushered in the dilemma that the first one produces satisfying 
results but is in conflict with the conception of coherence as mutual support, whereas the 
second and third one are (more) in line with this conception but produce bad results. The 
fourth strategy offered a way out, the consequence being that coherence is to be quantified 
with the help of our firmness measure if all intuitions and constraints are to be satisfied. In 
other words, someone who takes this route is well-advised to view coherence not as mutual 
incremental confirmation but rather as mutual absolute confirmation. 
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However that may be, there is room for further thoughts. While our test case focused 
on sets of individually consistent propositions, it seems that there are also sets of self-contra-
dictory propositions exhibiting different degrees of incoherence. These sets pose a threat for 
all probabilistic measures of coherence. To see why, consider the two sets S1 = {A1, A2} and 
S2 = {A1, A3}, where
A1: 27 is larger than 128.
A2: 128 is lower than 27. 
A3: 27 is lower than 128.
Since 27 = 128, all of these propositions are internally inconsistent. Nonetheless, while A2 
only rephrases what is asserted by A1, the assertions made by A1 and A3 are diametrically 
opposed. There is thus a sense in which the former propositions, although inconsistent, are 
less incoherent than the latter. Nonetheless, all probabilities involving any of these contra-
dictions are necessarily identical. Consequently, none of the above approaches can account 
for the intuitive difference in coherence. 
Another example pointing in the same direction was given by Siebel (2005). Imagine a 
physicist who cannot recall the voltage of a power source recently utilised in an experiment. 
The only thing she knows for sure is that it was either 1 V or 2 V or … or 50 V. Accord-
ingly, she assigns equal prior probabilities to these 50 alternatives. She asks three of her as-
sistants and receives the following answers:
B1: The voltage is 1 V.
B2: The voltage is 2 V.
B3: The voltage is 50 V.  
Given the proximity of the voltages in B1 and B2, it seems appropriate to claim that the 
set {B1, B2} is less incoherent than {B1, B3}. However, both sets involve pairwise inconsist-
ent propositions. Hence, given equal priors and equal (zero) posteriors, all probabilistic 
coherence measures will assign identical degrees of coherence to both sets. Again, these 
measures cannot account for the intuitive difference in coherence. But these guesses need 
a thorough investigation we leave for further research. Up to this point, the only viable 
general conclusion is that bringing together coherence and inconsistency is a difficult 
task.15
APPENDIX
A Test cases
TC1 denotes Schupbach’s original test case, TC2 is our variant with inconsistent testimo-
nies. TC2 (min.) are the results for the minimum-based adaption, TC2 (neutr.) for the 
neutrality-based adaptation, TC2 (mixed) for the mixed strategy and TC2 (def.) for the 
15  This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, priority programme New Frame-
works of Rationality (SPP 1516). For many valuable hints we are indebted to Vincenzo Crupi, Jakob 
Koscholke and the anonymous referees of Theoria and a further journal.
28 Michael Schippers and Mark Siebel
Theoria 30/1 (2015): 11-41
approach where only defined constituents are taken into account. The calculations were 
made with a computer programme in GNU Octave written by Jakob Koscholke.
Measure
TC1 TC2 TC2 (min.) TC2 (neutr.) TC2 (mixed) TC2 (def.)
SC 1 SC 2 SC 1 SC 2 SC 1 SC 2 SC 1 SC 2 SC1 SC2 SC 1 SC 2
Cd 0.198 0.188 –0.042 NaN –0.042 –1.000 –0.042 –0.167 –0.042 –0.750 –0.042 –0.222
Cr 1.556 1.778 0.750 NaN 0.750 0.000 0.750 0.500 0.750 0.250 0.750 0.000
Cs 0.308 0.229 –0.038 NaN –0.038 –1.000 –0.038 –0.250 –0.038 –0.750 –0.038 –0.333
Cj 2.458 NaN 1.000 NaN 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.250 1.000 0.000
Cz 0.311 0.254 –0.375 NaN –0.375 –1.000 –0.375 –0.500 –0.375 –0.750 –0.375 –1.000
Ck 0.382 0.343 –0.333 NaN –0.333 –1.000 –0.333 –0.500 –0.333 –0.750 –0.333 –1.000
Cf 0.084 –1.000 –0.500 NaN –0.500 –1.000 –0.500 –0.500 –0.500 –0.750 –0.500 –1.000
D 2.370 2.370 0.000 0.000
O 0.250 0.143 0.000 0.000
D* 0.312 0.162 –∞ –∞
O* 0.438 0.186 0.250 0.000
D*# 0.354 0.230 0.323 0.000
As to Bovens and Hartmann’s quasi-ordering, remember that ai is the probability that i of 
the given three testimonies are false. For scenario 1 in Schupbach’s original case, we thus get: 
a0 = P(suspect 1) = 1/8
a1 = P(suspect 4) + P(suspect 3) + P(suspect 2) = 3/8
a2 = 0
a3 = P(suspect 5, 6, 7 or 8) = 1/2
Fr (S)=
1/8+1/2 ⋅(1−r)3
1/8+3/8 ⋅(1−r)+1/2 ⋅(1−r)3
And for scenario 2:
a'0 = P(suspect 1) = 1/8
a'1 = 0
a'2 = P(suspect 6 or 7) + P(suspect 2 or 3) + P(suspect 4 or 5) = 3/4
a'3 = P(suspect 8) = 1/8
Fr ( ′S )=
1/8+1/8 ⋅(1−r)3
1/8+3/4 ⋅(1−r)2+1/8 ⋅(1−r)3
The reliability parameter r ranges from 0 to 1. By subtracting Fr(S' ) from Fr(S ) for these ar-
guments, we obtain the following function graph:
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This means that Fr(S ) is for some values of r larger and for other values smaller than Fr(S' ), with 
the result that Bovens and Hartmann’s account does not reach a verdict on the given test case.
B Adequacy constraints
Mutual support measures
Let S = {A1, ... , An} be a consistent set of propositions and S* = S ∪ {⊥} ; and let [S ] and 
[S* ] be the set of pairs of non-empty and non-overlapping subsets of S and S*, respectively. 
Then we have the following cardinalities (see Roche 2013): 
i) |[S]| = 3n – 2n+1 + 1
ii) |[S*]| = 3n+1 – 2n+2 + 1
iii) |[S*] \ [S]| = |[S*]| – |[S]| = 2 . 3n – 2n+1
Given the partition of the pairs (T, T' ) within [S* ] into the pairs (U, U' ) within [S ] and 
the pairs (V, V' ) within the remainder [S* ] \ [S ], we can rewrite the coherence value for an 
arbitrary coherence measure C based on confirmation measure s as follows:
Cs(S*)=
s(T , ′T )
(T , ′T )∈[S *]∑
S *[ ]
=
s(U , ′U )
(U , ′U )∈[S ]∑
S *[ ]
+
s(V , ′V )
(V , ′V )∈[S *]\[S ]∑
S *[ ]
=
=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅
s(U , ′U )
(U , ′U )∈[S ]∑
S[ ]
+
s(V , ′V )
(V , ′V )∈[S *]\[S ]∑
S *[ ]
=
=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
s(V , ′V )
(V , ′V )∈[S *]\[S ]∑
S *[ ]
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We begin with the first adaption strategy where the degree of confirmation is the mini-
mum in the case of inconsistent evidence or hypotheses. Since all pairs of the second ad-
dend in the equation above are such that ⊥ ∈ V or ⊥ ∈ V', we get:
Cs(S*)=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅min(s)
S *[ ]
a) Let s ∈ {d, s, z, k, f }, so that the minimum is –1 and the neutral value 0. Then:
Cs(S*)≥0
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S *[ ]
≥0
⇔ S[ ] ⋅Cs(S)≥ S *[ ]\ S[ ]
⇔Cs(S)≥
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S[ ]
=
2 ⋅3n −2n+1
3n −2n+1+1
But 3n > 1 , and therefore 2 . 3n – 2n+1 = 3n – 2n+1 + 3n > 3n – 2n+1 + 1. The latter fraction 
is thus greater than 1, which is in conflict with the fact that the maximum of the given 
measures is 1. Hence, Cs(S* ) < 0, viz., inconsistent sets of the type S* are incoherent; and 
thus the constraint (AC1) is satisfied. (AC2) is also satisfied. Given that Cs(S ) > –1, add-
ing an inconsistency lowers coherence because the opposite assumption entails a contra-
diction:
Cs(S*)≥Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S *[ ]
≥Cs(S)
⇔
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S *[ ]
≥Cs(S)⋅ 1−
S[ ]
S *[ ]





	

⇔Cs(S)≤
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S *[ ] ⋅ 1− S[ ]
S *[ ]





	

=
− S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ] \ S[ ]
=
− S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
=−1
Since the minimum of the measures in question is –1, the latter inequality is satisfied only 
if Cs(S ) = –1, that is, if S is maximally incoherent. Then the addition of an inconsistency 
leads to a set S* with the same coherence value, namely the minimum. In all other cases, 
Cs(S* ) < Cs(S ).
b) Now let s ∈ {r, j}. Here the minimum is 0 and the neutral value 1, with the follow-
ing result:
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Cs(S*)>1
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅0
S *[ ]
>1
⇔Cs(S)>
S *[ ]
S[ ]
Since S* contains one element more than S, so that |[S*]| > |[S]|, the fraction on the right 
side of the latter inequality is greater than 1. Hence, S* can be coherent as long as S is co-
herent (to a certain degree depending on its size). But the coherence of S* cannot be higher 
than the one of S because this would result in a contradiction:
Cs(S*)>Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅0
S *[ ]
>Cs(S)
⇒ S[ ] > S *[ ]
The latter is impossible because |[S*]| > |[S]|. On the other hand, S* can possess the same 
coherence value as S; but this is the case only if Cs(S ) = 0, that is, if S is maximally incoher-
ent.
According to the second adaption strategy, the degree of confirmation is the neutral 
value when the evidence or the hypothesis is inconsistent. Again, since all pairs (V, V ' ) in 
[S*] \ [S] are such that ⊥ ∈ V or ⊥ ∈ V', we get:
Cs(S*)=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅neutr(s)
S *[ ]
a) Let s ∈ {d, s, z, k, f }. These measures have the neutral value 0; therefore:
Cs(S*)>0
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅0
S *[ ]
>0
⇔Cs(S)>0
Hence, if the consistent set S is coherent, the inconsistent expansion S* is also coherent. 
On the other hand, S* cannot be more coherent than S because, again, this assumption en-
tails a contradiction:
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Cs(S*)>Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅0
S *[ ]
>Cs(S)
⇒ S[ ] > S *[ ]
However, if Cs(S ) is 0, then Cs(S* ) is also 0. In other words, the addition of an inconsist-
ency leads to a set with the same coherence value if the original set is neither coherent nor 
incoherent. This is also in conflict with the adequacy constraint that such an addition al-
ways lowers coherence.
b) Now let s ∈ {r, j}. Since the neutral value of these support measures is 1, we get:
Cs(S*)>1
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅1
S *[ ]
>1
⇔Cs(S)>
S *[ ]
S[ ]
−
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S[ ]
=
S *[ ] − S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S[ ]
=
S[ ]
S[ ]
=1
This means that S* is coherent if S is coherent. Still more, the coherence of S* can be higher 
than the one of S because
Cs(S*)>Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
S *[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅1
S *[ ]
>Cs(S)
⇔
S *[ ] − S[ ]
S *[ ]
>Cs(S)⋅ 1−
S[ ]
S *[ ]





	
⇔
S *[ ] − S[ ]
S *[ ]
>Cs(S)⋅
S *[ ] − S[ ]
S *[ ]
⇔1>Cs(S)
Therefore, the coherence value of S* is higher than the one of S if the latter set is incoherent.
The third adaption strategy is a mixture of the first two: according to it, s(B, A) is 
neutral if A is inconsistent and minimal if B is inconsistent. Hence, we get
Cs(S*)
S[ ]
S *[ ]
Cs(S)

1
2
min s 	
(W ,W ) [S *]\[S ], W
S *[ ]


1
2
neutr s 	
(W ,W ) [S *]\[S ],
S *[ ]
W
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a) Let s ∈ {d, s, z, k, f }, such that the minimum is –1 and the neutral value is 0. Then 
we get: 
Cs(S*)=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)−
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
Regarding adequacy constraint (AC1), this means:
Cs(S*)s >0
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)>
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
⇔ S[ ] ⋅Cs(S)>
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ]
⇔(3n −2n+1+1)⋅Cs(S)> 3n −2n
⇔Cs(S)>
3n −2n
3n −2n+1
The given inequation is satisfiable: if n = 2, then Cs(S ) > 5/6, which lies in the range of the 
coherence measures in question. Hence, these measures violate (AC1) because they allow 
a set with an inconsistency to be coherent. Even more, as the following derivation shows, 
they also violate (AC2):
Cs(S*)≥Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)−
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
≥Cs(S)
⇔−
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
≥
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)
⇔Cs(S)≤−
1
2
Accordingly, if S is fairly incoherent, that is, Cs(S ) < –1/2, then adding a contradiction 
yields an increase in coherence; and if S’s degree of coherence is equal to –1/2, then adding 
a contradiction has no impact on the degree of coherence. 
b) Now let s ∈ {r, j} so that the minimum is 0 while the neutral value is 1. Then
Cs(S*)=
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
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We get the following result with respect to adequacy constraint (AC1):
Cs(S*)s >1
⇔Cs(S)+
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
>
S *[ ]
S[ ]
⇔Cs(S)>
S *[ ] − 12 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ]
S[ ]
⇔Cs(S)>
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ] + S[ ]
S[ ]
⇔Cs(S)>
1
2 ⋅
(3n+1−2n+2+1)+(3n −2n+1+1)
3n −2n+1+1
To show that this latter inequation is satisfiable, let n = 2. Then Cs(S ) > 1 if and only if 
Cs(S ) > 7/2 Given that both measures in question range from 0 to ∞, a coherence value 
above 7/2 is not hard to achieve. We thus conclude that these measures violate (AC1). 
That the same conclusion holds with respect to (AC2) is shown by the following deriva-
tion:
Cs(S*)s ≥Cs(S)
⇔
S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)+
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
≥Cs(S)
⇔
1
2 ⋅
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
≥
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
S *[ ]
⋅Cs(S)
⇔Cs(S)≤
1
2
Hence, for fairly incoherent sets S, i.e. Cs(S ) ≤ 1/2, adding an inconsistency does not yield 
a decrease in coherence and may even yield an increase (provided that the inequation is 
strict). 
The fourth adaption strategy is to identify the coherence of a set with the average of 
defined support values. Due to the fact that we consider mutual support, in half of the pairs 
(V, V' ) within [S*] \ [S] the inconsistency is contained in the hypothesis V and in half of 
the pairs it is contained in the evidence V'. 
a) Let s ∈ {d, s, z}. These measures are not defined for inconsistent evidence and pro-
vide the neutral value 0 for inconsistent hypotheses. Since there are 1/2 . |[S*]\[S]| pairs 
with inconsistent hypotheses and thus |[S]| + 1/2 . |[S*]\[S]| pairs in total, we get:
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Cs(S*)=
(U , ′U )
(U , ′U )∈[S ]∑
S *[ ] + 12 ⋅[S*]\[S]
+
1
2 ⋅[S*]\[S] ⋅0
S[ ] + 12 ⋅[S*]\[S]
=
[S]
S[ ] + 12 ⋅[S*]\[S]
⋅Cs(S)
Since the other terms in this fraction are positive, Cs(S* ) will be positive if Cs(S ) is positive. 
That is, the inconsistent set S* can be coherent. Furthermore, S* can possess a greater coher-
ence value than S. For the given fraction is smaller than 1. So, if Cs(S ) is a negative number, 
Cs(S* ) will be greater than Cs(S ). In other words, if S is incoherent, S* is less incoherent.
b) Now let s ∈ {r, j, k}. Then the values defined for S* are just the values for S. For 
[S*] \ [S] consists of pairs (V, V' ) where at least one of these sets contains ⊥. But if the evi-
dence V' is inconsistent, the numerator P(V|V' ) of r and j is not defined and the denomina-
tor P(V'|V ) + P(V'|¬V ) of k is 0. Similarly, if the hypothesis V is inconsistent, the numera-
tor P(V'|V ) – P(V'|¬V ) of k is not defined and the denominators P(V' ) of r and P(V|¬V' ) 
are 0. Since all of the additional support values for S* are thus not defined, calculating the 
coherence of S* boils down to calculating the coherence of S. Hence, first, inconsistent sets 
can be coherent; and second, adding an inconsistency does not lower coherence.
c) Finally, consider f. This measure is not defined if the evidence V' is inconsistent, and 
it provides the minimum –1 if the hypothesis V is inconsistent. We thus get:
C f (S*)>0
⇔
S[ ] ⋅C f (S)+
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S[ ] + 12 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ]
>0
⇔ S[ ] ⋅C f (S)−
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] >0
⇔C f (S)>
S *[ ]\ S[ ]
2 ⋅ S[ ]
⇔C f (S)>
2 ⋅3n −2n+1
2 ⋅(3n −2n+1+1) =
3n −2n+1
3n −2n+1+1
3n – 2n > 3n – 2n+1 + 1 if and only if 2n > 1, which holds for all n ≥ 2. But this would mean 
that the latter fraction is greater than 1 for all n ≥ 2, which cannot be true because the 
maximum of f is 1. Hence, sets of the type S* are not coherent. Even more, provided that 
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Cf (S) > –1, they must be less coherent than the original set S because, again, assuming oth-
erwise leads to a contradiction:
C f (S*)≥C f (S)
⇔
S[ ] ⋅C f (S)+
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅−1
S[ ] + 12 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ]
≥C f (S)
⇔ S[ ] ⋅C f (S)−
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] ≥ S[ ] + 12 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ]




⋅C f (S)
⇔ S[ ] ⋅C f (S)−
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] ≥ S[ ] ⋅C f (S)+
1
2 ⋅ S *
[ ]\ S[ ] ⋅C f (S)
⇔−1≥C f (S)
Since the minimum of f is –1, the latter inequation is true only if S is maximally incoher-
ent. In this case, adding an inconsistency does not lower coherence because it leads to a set 
which is likewise maximally incoherent. But if Cf (S) > –1, S* is less coherent than S.
The refined overlap measure
Let S = {A1, ... , An} be a consistent set of propositions and [S]≥2 the set of subsets of S with a 
cardinality of at least 2. Then: 
[S]≥2 = n
i





	
i=2
n
∑ =2n −(n+1)
If we add an inconsistency ⊥, so that S* = {A1, ... , An , ⊥}, we get:
|[S*]≥2\[S]≥2| = |[S*]≥2| – |[S]≥2| = (2n+1 – (n + 2)) – (2n – (n + 1)) = 2n – 1
Since the sets in [S*]≥2\[S]≥2 contain an inconsistency and thus get the value 0 by the naïve 
overlap measure O, we have the following representation for the refined overlap measure:
O *(S*)= 1
[S*]≥2
⋅ O(Si )
Si∈[S *]i
∑
i=2
n+1
∑ = 1[S*]≥2 ⋅ [S]
≥2 ⋅O *(S)+(2n −1)⋅0( )
=
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅O *(S)
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Assuming that 0.5 is the neutral value separating coherence and incoherence, we get:
O *(S*)> 12
⇒
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅O *(S)> 12
⇒O *(S)> [S*]
≥2
2 ⋅[S]≥2
⇒O *(S)> 2
n+1−(n+2)
2n+1−(2n+2)
⇒O *(S)>1
Since O*(S) ≤ 1 for all S, the latter inequation cannot be true. Hence, S* is always judged 
incoherent. Now we turn to the question whether S* can be more coherent than S:
O *(S*)>O *(S)
⇒
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅O *(S)>O *(S)
⇒ [S]≥2 > [S*]≥2
The latter inequation is unsatisfiable because S* contains one element more than S. 
Accordingly, S* can never be judged more coherent than S if O*(S) > 0. Otherwise, 
O*(S) = O*(S*) = 0.
The refined Schupbach-measure 
We begin with the first adaption strategy. Given that D*# is an average of coherence-values, 
we adapt this measure by assigning the maximum degree of incoherence 0 to all inconsistent 
subsets, i.e., all subsets of S* containing ⊥. Hence we get:
D#*(S*)=
1
[S*]≥2
⋅ D#*(Si )
Si∈[S *]i
∑
i=2
n+1
∑ = 1[S*]≥2 ⋅ [S]
≥2 ⋅D#*(S)+(2n −1)⋅0( )
=
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅D#*(S)
Accordingly, for the neutral value 0.5 we get the following result:
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D#*(S*)>
1
2
⇒
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅D#*(S)>
1
2
⇒D#*(S)>
[S*]≥2
2 ⋅[S]≥2
⇒D#*(S)>
2n+1−(n+2)
2n+1−(2n+2)
⇒D#*(S)>1
Given that D*#(S) ≤ 1 for all S, the latter inequation leads to a contradiction. Accordingly, 
S* is always judged incoherent. But can S* nevertheless be more coherent than S?
D#*(S*)>D#*(S)
⇒
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅D#*(S)>D#*(S)
⇒ [S]≥2 > [S*]≥2
The latter inequation is, again, unsatisfiable. Therefore, S* is judged less coherent than S if 
D*#(S) > 0. Otherwise, D*#(S) = D*#(S*) = 0.
The second adaption is to assign the neutral value 0.5 to inconsistent subsets: 
D#*(S*)=
1
[S*]≥2
⋅ D#*(Si )
Si∈[S *]i
∑
i=2
n+1
∑ = 1[S*]≥2 ⋅ [S]
≥2 ⋅D#*(S)+(2n −1)⋅ 12






Thus we get: 
D#*(S*)>
1
2
⇔
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅D#*(S)+
2n −1
2 ⋅[S*]≥2 >
1
2
⇔2 ⋅[S]≥2 ⋅D#*(S)+(2n −1)> [S*]≥2
⇔D#*(S)>
1−2n
[S]≥2
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Given that 1 – 2n < 0 for all n ≥ 2, D*#(S*) always exceeds the threshold 0.5 so that S* is co-
herent. Furthermore:
D#*(S*)>D#*(S)
⇔
[S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⋅D#*(S)+
2n −1
2 ⋅[S*]≥2 >D#
*(S)
⇔
2n −1
2 ⋅[S*]≥2 >D#
*(S)⋅ [S*]
≥2 − [S]≥2
[S*]≥2
⇔
2n −1
2 ⋅[S*]≥2 >D#
*(S)⋅ 2
n −1
[S*]≥2
⇔D#*(S)<
1
2
Therefore, S* is more coherent than S if and only if S is incoherent.
The third approach only considers defined constituents when calculating coherence. 
We thus get:
D#*(S*)=
1
[S]≥2
⋅ [S]≥2 ⋅D#*(S)( )=D#*(S)
Accordingly, S and S* are always on a par with respect to their degrees of coherence. 
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